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Duquesne Law Review
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-CHANGE OF VENUE "FOR JURY PREJUDICE-The
United States Supreme Court has held that a state statute preventing a
change of venue for a jury trial in a criminal case, solely on the ground
that the crime with which defendant was charged was a misdemeanor,
violates the right to trial by impartial jury guaranteed by the four-
teenth amendment.
Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971).
Petitioner, a Roman Catholic priest, was arrested on a charge of resist-
ing arrest, a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum fine of $500 or. by
imprisonment in the county jail for not longer than one year, or both.'
Prior to trial he moved for a change of venue to a county where alleged
community prejudice did not exist. He asked the court to take judicial
notice of news media coverage of the civil rights demonstrations, which
ultimately led to his arrest. Petitioner's motion was denied on the
ground that Wisconsin law did not permit a change of venue in jury
trials for misdemeanors. He was tried before a jury and convicted.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, 2 ruling that
the Wisconsin statute3 prevented a change of venue in petitioner's case.
Moreover, the state court rejected petitioner's contention that the
statute was unconstitutional. The majority opinion followed two lines
of analysis. First, the court pointed out that it would be most unusual
for an entire community to prejudge the guilt of one accused of a mis-
demeanor. 4 This would be especially true in a community the size of
Milwaukee County, where petitioner was tried. Second, a defendant in
a Wisconsin misdemeanor prosecution is guaranteed several procedures
with which he can protect his right to an impartial hearing. He may
ask for continuances until the adverse publicity and its prejudicial
effects subside. He can screen the prospective jurors on voir dire, chal-
lenging prejudiced veniremen. Finally, he has the right to move for a
new trial for want of an impartial jury.5
1. WIS. STAT. § 946.41(1) (1967).
2. 41 Wis. 2d 312, 164 NW.2d 266 (1969).
3. The relevant statute in effect at the time of the trial was Wis. STAT. § 956.03(3)
(1967), which provided:
If a defendant who is charged with a felony files his affidavit that an impartial trial
cannot be had in the county, the court may change the venue of the action to any
county where an impartial trial can be had.
WIS. STAT. § 971.22, effective July 1, 1970, now permits a change of venue in all criminal
cases.
4. 41 Wis. 2d at 317, 164 N.W.2d at 268.
5. Id. at 321, 164 N.W.2d at 270.
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The United States Supreme Court, per Justice Stewart, 6 reversed the
conviction and remanded, holding that the Wisconsin statute violated
the right to trial by an impartial jury, guaranteed in state prosecutions
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. It is submitted,
that the Court misapplied existing precedent and failed to answer the
Wisconsin court's rationale. Reasonable alternatives to the change of
venue did exist, and the change of venue, standing alone, was not
sufficient to insure a fair trial.
The Court found Rideau v. Louisiana7 to be controlling precedent.
After briefly discussing the general problem of pre-trial publicity,"
Justice Stewart concluded that in Rideau the Court had explicitly held
that only a change of venue was sufficient to insure an impartial jury.9
In Rideau, petitioner was arested shortly after a bank robbery which
had resulted in a kidnapping and murder. The next day, before arraign-
ment, a twenty-minute sound film of an "interview" between the
sheriff and petitioner was televised on a local station. In the film, which
was rebroadcast later, petitioner admitted the robbery, kidnapping, and
murder. He was then arraigned on the three charges to which he had
confessed. His motion for a change of venue was denied; he was con-
victed of murder and sentenced to death. The Court held that it was a
denial of due process to refuse the change of venue after the community
had been repeatedly exposed to the spectacle of petitioner confessing
to the crimes.' 0
Rideau should be distinguished on several grounds. First, the alleged
crimes in Rideau were ghastly felonies, ones which, when committed,
would immediately attract the attention and interest of the community.
Petitioner in Groppi was only charged with a misdemeanor not likely
to captivate the attention of the community. The Court ignored this
distinction. In misdemeanors the risk of adverse and prejudicial pre-
6. 400 U.S. 505 (1971).
7. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
8. The Court distinguished Groppi from Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966),
in which it had enumerated several of the affirmative measures available to a trial court
when the jury is threatened by prejudicial publicity before and during the trial. 400 U.S.
at 509-510. In Sheppard the Court suggested stricter regulation of news media representa-
tives in the courtroom, insulation of witnesses, prohibitions against the release of non-
record information by counsel or officers of the court, in addition to the "traditinal
safeguards" of continuances, voir dire, change of venue, and motion for a new trial. 384
U.S. at 362. The Court in Groppi narrowed the issue to the sufficiency of the various
traditional procedures in the context of a trial already permeated with prejudicial
publicity. 400 U.S. at 509.
9. 400 U.S. at 510.
10. 373 U.S. at 727.
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trial publicity and of resulting community prejudice against the
accused is slight. The misdemeanor defendant does not need the
insulation against adverse and prejudicial publicity the accused felon
requires for an impartial trial, nor does the misdemeanor defendant
require the vast array of remedial procedures the accused felon needs to
correct the adverse effects of community prejudice."
Second, Rideau should be distinguished on the basis of the nature
and effect of the pre-trial publicity involved. Rideau involved a twenty-
minute spectacle of confession, widely broadcast before the trial. The
Court, in Rideau, found the effect of the publicity was such that any
subsequent proceedings could have been no more than a formality.'2
In Groppi, however, petitioner at no time offered evidence of prejudicial
media coverage, or of the effect of media coverage on the impartiality
of his jury.13 Thus, in Rideau there appeared a definite prejudicial
effect, whereas the record in Groppi was, at best, nebulous as to proven
and demonstrable community prejudice.
Third, and most significantly, in Rideau the state had made the
change of venue available as a procedure to protect the right to trial by
impartial jury.14 Petitioner in Rideau was denied a right to which he
was entitled. In Groppi, the state had not provided the change of venue,
but did guarantee other procedures of supposedly the same effect.
Justice Black concluded, in his dissent in Groppi, that so long as a
misdemeanor defendant could protect his right to an impartial jury
by a motion for a new trial, there was no infirmity in the Wisconsin
statute. 15
The misapplication of Rideau to Groppi is evidence of the Court's
failure to answer a fundamental premise underlying the Wisconsin
court's decision: that a person accused of a misdemeanor has other
procedures, without the change of venue, with which he can protect his
right to an impartial trial. The Court's analysis of the constitutional
weakness of the alternative procedures was insufficient. The Court
observed that the granting of continuances until prejudice has subsided
works against the values implicit in the right to a speedy trial.16 The
11. Felonies result in severe penalties and greater social stigma upon conviction; the
accused in a felony prosecution thus has more at stake than does the defendant in the
misdemeanor trial. The risk of community prejudice in the felony trial is much greater.
41 Wis. 2d at 317, 164 N.W.2d at 268.
12. 373 U.S. at 726.
13. 41 Wis. 2d at 321, 164 N.W.2d at 270.
14. LA. REV. STAT. § 15:293 (1950).
15. 400 U.S. at 515.
16. Id. at 510.
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continuance does inherently slow the trial process. The interest in a
trial free from community prejudice is sufficient to outweigh the need
for a speedy trial. One constitutional guarantee must be weighed
against the other, and the more critical value must prevail. The defect
which the Court found in the continuance also haunts the change of
venue. The accused, by seeking to move his trial to another place,
sacrifices the values implicit in having the trial where the alleged crime
was committed. 17
The Court also found voir dire to be constitutionally suspect as an
effective prejudice-screening device. Voir dire, the Court stated, is
inadequate to effectuate the fourteenth-amendment guarantee of an
impartial jury.x8 To support this conclusion, the Court cited an article
by Professor Broeder; 19 but careful examination of the article reveals
another misapplication by the Court. Professor Broeder's indictment of
voir dire focused more on the weaknesses of voir dire as used in the
ordinary, unpublicized trial, than on any inherent weakness in voir dire
examination per se. After studying twenty-three trials, Professor
Broeder synthesized four general weaknesses in voir dire as a prejudice-
screening device. First, veniremen were not selected from the com-
munity at large, but usually by a "blue ribbon" 20 method. Thus, an
objectionable characteristic2' found in one venireman was likely to be
found in all.22 Second, the courts' reputed hostility to prolonged ques-
tioning set a psychological time limit on examination of each venire-
man. Attorneys were reluctant to probe deeply, fearing the court or
the jurors might be alienated.23 Third, counsel could not anticipate
many factors which may have affected jurors' thinking.24 Fourth, Pro-
fessor Broeder noted a fatalistic acceptance of voir dire. Lawyers did
not appear to probe deeply into the background and ideas of each
17. Kaufman, The Judges and Jurors: Recent Developments in Selection of Jurors
and Fair Trial-Free Press, 41 U. CoLo. L. REv. 179, 198 (1969).
18. 400 U.S. at 510.
19. Id. citing Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REv.
503 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Broeder].
20. "Blue ribbon" or "key man" jury selection methods usually involve obtaining
names of prospective jurors from civic leaders and organizations, lodges, clubs, and
business and professional leaders rather than from voter lists or tax rolls. Broeder at 505.
21. The objectionable traits that appear to be of greatest concern in the study are
those which reflect upon a juror's possible attitude toward certain types of plaintiffs and
defendants, rather than exposure to prejudicial publicity. See generally Broeder.
22. Broeder at 505.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 505-506.
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venireman because the replacement might prove worse than the person
challenged.2 5
Even if Groppi was a highly-publicized case, the Court's reliance2
on Professor Broeder's article is not relevant to the problem of jury
impartiality and pre-trial publicity. The Court failed to consider
whether Professor Broeder's objections to voir dire were applicable to
the truly sensational trial. It is submitted that in such a trial, where the
risk of jury prejudice is high, counsel will be more than fatalistic in the
examination of veniremen. The attorney defending one accused of a
sensational crime will investigate the backgrounds of the prospective
jurors and will not alienate a court aware of the great risks involved2
Such objections to the effectiveness of voir dire as a prejudice-
screening device do not strike at any constitutional infirmity, but rather
to ills which modifications of existing practices could easily remedy.
Jury selection procedures need to be modified; veniremen should be
selected from voting lists to obtain a more representative sample of the
community. 2 The examination process could be reformed as was
suggested by the report of the American Bar Association Advisory
Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press in 1968.29 Standards for
successfully challenging a venireman must be lowered.30 Affirmative, as
distinguished from remedial measures, such as those suggested by the
Court in Sheppard v. Maxwell3' and those contained in the American
Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility,32 will work to
25. Id. at 507, 521.
26. Only Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), was cited in further support of the Court's
conclusions with respect to voir dire. 400 U.S. at 510. In Irvin, a highly-publicized case,
eight of twelve jurors admitted to having impressions as to petitioner's guilt. The Court
ruled that a juror's impressions did not render him unfit so long as he could put aside
his impressions and render a verdict based solely on the evidence. 366 U.S. at 723.
27. See 5 AM. JUR. TRIALS 258 (1966). See generally Okun, Investigation of Jurors by
Counsel: Its Impact on the Decisional Process, 56 Gao. L.J. 839 (1958), for an analysis of
the sources and methods available to investigate the background of the jurors.
28. Kaufrnann, supra note 18 at 181-182.
29. The report recommended that each venireman be questioned privately and sep-
arately, and that standards for the successful challenges of prospective jurors be lowered.
Id. at 191.
30. The causal relationship between exposure to prejudicial publicity and its effect
on jury impartiality is almost impossible to prove. State and federal courts both generally
presume that, absent definite proof to the contrary, veniremen who have been exposed
to pre-trial publicity are impartial. Comment, Free Trial v. Free Press: The Psychological
Effect of Pre-Trial Publicity on the Juror's Ability to be Impartial; A Plea for Reform,
38 S. CAL. L. REv. 672, 683 (1965). The psychological question whether or not preju-
dicial publicity would affect a juror's impartiality is left to the juror himself. Few jurors
would recognize the prejudicial effects, and those that did would probably be unwilling
to admit to prejudice in court. FRIENDLY AND GOLDFARB, CRIME AND PUBLICITY 103 (1967).
31. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
32. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-107. This rule regulates the dis-
semination of extra-judicial and non-record information by attorneys prior to, during, and
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prevent the dissemination of adverse and prejudicial publicity; and will
further insulate the judicial process.
Groppi lacked sound constitutional foundation. The Court, through
its misapplication of precedent, and its unconvincing analysis of the
traditional alternative remedies other than the change of venue, showed
that it had failed to go to the core of the community prejudice problem.
The risk of community prejudice in misdemeanor cases is slight. When
community prejudice does occur, as it allegedly did in Groppi, the
change of venue possesses no inherent superiority over other procedures
in correcting the harm that may be done to the right to an impartial
trial. When press coverage has been so intense, and of such scope as to
imperil the fairness of a misdemeanor trial, moving the trial to another
county is unlikely to result in a less prejudiced jury 3 Changing the
venue will only serve to bring the same publicity problems to the new
courtroom, where the defendant must rely on the same traditional
procedures that the Court found insufficient.
Norman K. Clark
CIVIL RIGHTS-HOUSING LAW-EFFECTS OF RACIAL CONCENTRATION IN
RENEWAL AREA-The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has held that the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment's approval of an urban renewal plan, by concentrating on land
use factors without inquiry into the effects of the type of housing on
racial concentration, does not comply with the Housing Act of 1949
and the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968.
Shannon v. United States Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970).
Plaintiffs were white and Negro residents, businessmen and represen-
tatives of private civic organizations in the East Poplar Urban Renewal
Area of Philadelphia. They brought this action against the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) seeking an injunction
after the trial, including the following: prior criminal record of the accused, existence or
contents of confessions, performance of examinations or accused's refusal to submit to
them, identity and testimony of potential witnesses, possibility of a plea of guilty to the
offense charges or to a lesser offense, and any opinion as to accused's guilt or innocence
or the merits or evidence of the case. Id.
33. Case Comment, 80 HARv. L. REV. 180, 183-184 (1966).
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